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Title:  “Women Have Found Respect”: Gender Quotas, Symbolic Representation and Female 
Empowerment in Rwanda 
Author: Jennie E. Burnet, Department of Anthropology, University of Louisville 
Abstract: Building on previous studies of women’s formal, descriptive, and substantive 
representation in Rwanda, this article examines women’s symbolic representation, meaning the 
broader social and cultural impact of the greater representation of women in the Rwandan 
political system. It explores the cultural meanings of gender quotas by analyzing popular 
perceptions of women, of women’s roles in politics and society more broadly, and of changing 
cultural practices vis-à-vis gender. Data were gathered over twenty four months of ethnographic 
research conducted between 1997 and 2009, and ongoing documentary research. The study finds 
that although Rwandan women have made few legislative gains, they have reaped other benefits, 
including increased respect from family and community members, enhanced capacity to speak 
and be heard in public forums, greater autonomy in decision-making in the family, and increased 
access to education. Yet, there have also been some unexpected negative consequences such as 
increased friction with male siblings, male withdrawal from politics, increased marital discord, 
and a perception that marriage as an institution has been disrupted by the so-called “upheaval” of 
gender roles. Most significantly, increased formal representation of women has not led to 
increased democratic legitimacy for the government. 
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Title:  “Women Have Found Respect”: Gender Quotas, Symbolic Representation and Female 
Empowerment in Rwanda 
Author: Jennie E. Burnet, Department of Anthropology, University of Louisville 
 
Gender quota policies, aimed at increasing the proportion of women in political office, 
now exist in more than 100 countries.1 While gender quota policies tend to emphasize the 
number of women in government, in many countries they “have led to a shift not only in the 
political agenda but also in the gender consciousness of female representatives and the political 
engagement of female constituents” (Krook 2006:111). The use of gender quotas to increase 
women’s representation rests on political theory about representation. Pitkin’s (1967) seminal 
work on political representation conceived of representation as multi-faceted, comprised of 
formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation. Using Pitkin’s theoretical model, 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005:424) tested an integrated model of women’s representation in 
thirty one countries. Their results confirmed the interconnectedness of these dimensions of 
representation and suggested that increased formal and descriptive representation of women 
increases legislatures’ responsiveness to women’s concerns. Yet, they also found that “women’s 
policy responsiveness has little or no influence on women’s perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
legislature” (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:424). Since their analysis only included 
representative democracies, it is unclear whether the same interconnectedness holds for non-
democratic governments who implement gender quotas. 
In this article, I examine the impact of gender quotas on the symbolic representation of 
women and girls in Rwandan society. Building on my previous study of women’s formal, 
descriptive, and substantive representation in Rwanda (Burnet 2008a), my main purpose is to 
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understand the cultural meanings of national, local, and party gender quotas in the Rwandan 
political system. Rwandan women have reaped little legislative benefit from the increased 
presence of women in the legislature (Burnet 2008a). However, little legislative impact does not 
necessarily mean that gender quotas have had no impact at all. What does the increased presence 
of women in governance symbolize for ordinary citizens? Have public attitudes towards women, 
whether as political leaders or ordinary members of society, changed? Have gender quotas raised 
awareness of what women can achieve? Have quotas legitimated women “as political actors, 
unraveling at least to some degree previously accepted gender roles” (Franceschet, Krook, and 
Piscopo, N.d.)? How have public attitudes towards women in politics and women in general 
changed in response to the increased representation of women in governance structures? I 
address these questions by examining women’s (and some men’s) perceptions of women as well 
as women’s roles in politics and society more broadly. I also consider changing cultural practices 
vis-à-vis gender. These data were gathered over twenty four months of ethnographic research 
conducted between 1997 and 2009, as well as ongoing documentary research. 
Rwanda is frequently cited as a success story in terms of the impact of gender quotas. In 
2008, Rwanda became the first and only country in the world with a majority-female, national 
legislative body. Yet, more detailed analysis of the Rwandan case reveals that increased 
representation of women has not led to a greater statutory protection of women’s rights, nor has 
it led to a more democratic political terrain. Nonetheless, this case study finds that gender quotas 
have generated impacts far beyond the political sphere. The top-down policies that brought large 
numbers of women into government improved women’s career and economic opportunities, 
thereby improving social mobility among women. Because quotas apply to national, regional, 
and local levels, their impact has been broad and deep. Additionally, the RPF’s women-friendly 
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policies overturned the colonial and post-colonial patriarchal gender paradigm, whereby 
husbands worked and made important decisions while wives managed the domestic sphere and 
remained financially dependent on men. Yet, urban, elite women have reaped the greatest 
benefits from these changes, thanks to increased access to salaried jobs, including lucrative 
positions in the national legislature and ministries, and greater purchasing power (for items like 
automobiles, clothing, and domestic servants), whereas rural peasant women in elected positions 
in local government have seen their workload increase and their economic security undermined.  
Another key finding of this case study is that citizens do not distinguish between the 
impact of gender quotas and many other policy changes and laws that have improved the status 
of women in Rwandan society more broadly. When asked about the impact of the gender quotas, 
respondents did not make explicit, causal links between the increased representation of women in 
all branches of government at the national, regional, and local levels, on the one hand, and new 
women-friendly legislation or policies or changed relationships between citizens and the state, on 
the other. Rather, they viewed the quotas as part of this broader set of reforms implemented by 
the RPF-led government. Given that policy decisions and their implementation flow top-down, 
and that members of parliament are not perceived as representing constituents’ interests or 
concerns, it is no surprise that citizens link the gender quota policy and women in office to a 
broader set of commitments to gender equality.  These government policies have had a diffuse 
and widespread impact on citizens’ daily lives, particularly in terms of women’s choices and 
opportunities.  
After a brief explanation of my research methods, I provide background information on 
the Rwandan political system, Rwandan conceptions of gender, and the evolution of gender 
quotas in Rwanda. Then, I present data on the positive impacts of gender quotas as perceived by 
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ordinary Rwandans. In the third section, I discuss popular perceptions of the negative impacts of 
gender quotas.  In the concluding section, I discuss the implications of the data and the 
relationships between gender, power and democratic legitimacy, as well as the implications of 
the Rwandan case for political theory about gender quotas and political representation of 
marginalized groups. 
Methodology 
This article is based on ethnographic research conducted in urban and rural Rwanda 
between 1997 and 2009, including over a hundred formal interviews with the leaders and 
members of women’s civil society organizations, several hundred ethnographic interviews with 
ordinary citizens in rural and urban Rwanda, as well as monitoring of legal statutes and policy 
changes in Rwanda and ongoing literature reviews. In depth, ethnographic research constitutes a 
holistic approach, often summarized as “participant observation,” and has widespread acceptance 
within anthropology. This approach consists of intensive, mixed methods research often with a 
focus on qualitative data.2 Data collected as part of my ongoing ethnographic research in 
Rwanda have included indirect and direct observations of behavior, and elicitation techniques, 
including ethnographic interviews, unstructured and semi-structured individual interviews, semi-
structured group interviews, and structured interviews.3 In the highly politicized context of post-
genocide Rwanda, ethnographic interviews have proven to be “the only realistic tool available 
for gathering information” as Bernard and Ryan (2010:28) explain. While ethnographic 
interviews appear to be informal conversation, they are instead intentional interactions on the 
part of the ethnographer who elicits information on issues of interest through the use of simple 
questions, such as “What do you think about X?” or by asking follow-up questions when 
informants spontaneously bring up an issue of interest to the ethnographer. According to Bernard 
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and Ryan, the goal of ethnographic interviews is “to understand the cultural norms” (Bernard and 
Ryan 2010:28).    
To investigate the cultural implications of the gender quota policies, I conducted 
individual and group interviews with male and female citizens in urban and rural Rwanda, 
grassroots women’s organizations, members of government, former members of government, 
and women leaders of civil society organizations on the cultural implications of the gender quota 
policies during a five week field trip in 2009. This intentional sample was selected in order to 
assess the broader impacts of gender quotas on Rwandan society and perceptions of women. 
Except where noted, I conducted all interviews myself in either Kinyarwanda, French or English. 
Interviews in Kinyarwanda were conducted with a Rwandan interpreter.4 Questions about the 
impact of gender quotas were integrated into semi-structured interviews that covered several 
other topics. First, a basic question on the impact of gender quotas was asked: “What changes in 
Rwandan society or your daily life have resulted from the government’s gender quota policy?” 
Then, several probing questions were used to elicit additional information, such as: (1) 
“Anything else?” (2) “You mentioned many positive changes, have there been any negative 
changes?” (3) “You mentioned several negative changes, have there been any positive changes?” 
 All interviewees refused to be recorded with a digital audio recorder so interview 
“transcripts” were recreated based on detailed, handwritten notes taken by the author and 
interpreter.5 Ethnographic interview were recorded in field notes written on a daily basis. The 
interview transcripts and field notes were coded using in vivo coding for major themes that 
emerged during the interviews. Additional themes were generated during the production of 
interview transcripts and during reading transcripts and field notes after the fact. A subset of 
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themes were then selected and developed into a code book for use in data analysis, as described 
by Bernard and Ryan (2010, Chapters 3 and 4).   
The 2009 data were then compared with earlier data gathered in previous field trips to 
Rwanda. Throughout the 15 years I have been conducting research on Rwanda, data collected 
have included interview transcripts, detailed field notes written on a daily basis, Rwandan 
newspaper and magazine articles, online articles and discussions on Rwandan websites, and 
ongoing monitoring of the New Times (Rwanda’s daily, independent English-language 
newspaper), BBC Kinyarwanda-Kirundi news service, and Imvaho Nshya (Rwanda’s daily 
government-run Kinyarwanda-language newspaper), as well as allAfrica.com which draws news 
stories from sources across the continent.6  
In the 2009 group interviews, most respondents were female, but some men were also 
interviewed on the subject.7 Throughout this article, I indicate the sex of interviewees and 
usually the region where the interview was conducted, but names and other identifying 
information have been withheld per confidentiality protocols. Given the composition of my 
sample, I am primarily relating the effects of women’s attitudes and of men’s attitudes as 
perceived by women. 
Rwandan Politics, Gender Quotas, and the Women’s Agenda 
Rwanda is probably best known for the 1994 genocide in which at least 500,000 
Rwandans, primarily Tutsi as well as politically-moderate Hutu, lost their lives in state-
sanctioned massacres.8 The genocide occurred in the midst of a civil war, which began in 
October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel movement based in Uganda, 
invaded Rwanda.9 The genocide came to a halt when the RPF seized the capital, Kigali, on July 4, 
1994. In mid-July 1994, the RPF named a transitional government, which it called the 
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‘Government of National Unity,’ whose composition reaffirmed the RPF’s promised 
commitment to power sharing outlined in the Arusha Accords by including representatives from 
political parties that had not supported the genocide. By 1995, it was clear that the power-sharing 
arrangement was more window-dressing than reality as the RPF exerted greater influence than 
the other parties and mandated most policies. This consensual dictatorship continued until 1998 
when the government launched a transition process that it called “democratization.” 
This transition began with the election of grassroots administrative leaders at the 10-
house, cell and sector levels through queuing behind candidates at open air community meetings. 
District-level elections through secret ballot were held in 2001, and a Constitutional Commission 
was appointed. In 2003, a new constitution was approved through national referendum in May 
followed by presidential elections in August and parliamentary elections in September. Despite 
these elections, the RPF-regime has become more authoritarian since this transition process 
began (Longman 2006, 146; Reyntjens 2006).  The “orchestrated nature of elections is an open 
secret in Rwanda” (Burnet 2008a, 366). RPF officials have vetted candidates in elections at 
every level since 1998, and in most communities, the population was informed in advance of the 
“correct” candidate for whom to vote.10 Beyond influencing election outcomes, the RPF-regime 
has maintained tight reins on the government and private media by silencing dissenting voices 
systematically, suppressing independent civil society organizations, and destroying potential 
opposition parties (Reyntjens 2010). 
Rwanda ranks very low on most democracy measures.11 The 2003 Constitution created a 
presidential system with a national parliament and prime minister who performs many of the 
duties of a vice president. Most seats in both houses of parliament are elected through direct 
elections, but eight senators are appointed by the President and another four by the Forum of 
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Political Formations. The Rwandan political system is nominally multi-party, but in practice it is 
a single party system with the RPF functioning as a state party. While Parliament is majority 
female, most of these women are card-carrying members of the RPF or its coalition partners. In 
addition, women elected to seats reserved for women were nominated, or at least vetted, by the 
RPF via the Forum of Political Parties, an umbrella organization that all political parties must 
join by constitutional mandate. Thus, most of these women owe allegiance to the RPF rather than 
to the constituencies who elected them.  
Despite its authoritarian approach to governance, the RPF has mainstreamed women from 
the beginning and many of its policies have been modeled after the National Resistance 
movement in Uganda (Longman 2006, 140). Some of its achievements include the creation of a 
ministry of gender, the creation of women’s councils from the grassroots to the national level, 
and the promotion of women’s civil society organizations (Burnet 2008a, 373-380). Numerous 
pieces of legislation have extended additional rights to women, including classification of rape or 
sexual torture as among the most serious crimes in the genocide statute, additional rights for 
pregnant and breast-feeding women in the workplace, a law outlining children’s rights that 
included all the rights outlined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child, the 
2003 Constitution which mandated women must occupy at least 30 percent of positions in 
decision-making bodies, and a gender-based violence law (Burnet 2008a; Devlin & Elgie 2008, 
249). Yet, as Devlin and Elgie (2008, 249) note, only one significant piece of legislation (the 
gender-based violence law) was passed after the 2003 elections when legislative gender quotas 
began. Many improvements in the situation of women and women’s rights in Rwanda emerged 
from women’s civil society organizations and the women’s movement in Rwanda prior to the 
institution of gender quotas. For example, the granting of inheritance rights to girl children 
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through changes in the marriage laws in 1998 could not have been achieved without lobbying by 
women civil society organizations and women in the government (Burnet 2008a).12  
 On the international stage, Rwanda is often perceived as a success story where the 1994 
genocide gave way to a subsequent renaissance in Rwandan society under the guidance of the 
RPF’s Paul Kagame, initially as Vice President and later as President. The notable advances of 
women have contributed to this perception (Burnet 2008a, 370-371; Powley 2003, 2005, 2008a, 
2008b). The 2001 district-level elections, which included reserved seats (approximately 30 
percent) for women at the cell, sector, and district levels of government, led to a dramatic 
increase in female representation in local government. Thus, the story of women’s representation 
in Rwanda extends far beyond the national government, penetrating all the way down to the 
grassroots. Given that the vast majority of citizens only rarely (or even never) come into contact 
with senators or deputies but come into monthly contact with local officials at mandatory 
community meetings and communal labor projects (umuganda), it is not surprising that the 
majority of ordinary Rwandans interviewed for this research spoke most often about women in 
the local government and community rather than the national legislature.  
 Despite these remarkable gains by women, several analysts have concluded that the 
RPF’s women-friendly policies have been manipulated as a tool to help maintain their hold on 
power and to maintain a positive reception from the international community (Burnet 2008a; 
Longman 2006; Reyntjens 2010). Yet, whether or not the RPF served its own ends through the 
increased protection of women’s rights and the greater representation of women in government, 
these policies could “lead to transformations in political identities, subjectivities, and agencies” 
and might “pave the way for effective engagement in democratic governance should it emerge” 
(Burnet 2008a, 386).  In this article I attempt to assess these transformations and understand 
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them as resulting from the increased symbolic representation of women in the Rwandan public 
sphere. 
 Gender roles have changed dramatically since the 1994 genocide. The genocide, civil war 
(1990-1994), and their aftermaths resulted in rapid change within society, especially in terms of 
gender roles. The civil war and genocide produced over two million refugees along with 
hundreds of thousands more internally displaced persons. The economic and physical 
infrastructure had been destroyed at every level. Following the genocide, many Rwandan women 
found themselves as heads of household, whether because their husbands were dead, in exile, in 
prison, or in military service with the RPF. Survivors, particularly women, found that so-called 
“traditional” ways of life and modes of being were no longer possible.  
According to Rwandan custom, women relied on men for access to the means of 
livelihood (Burnet and RISD 2003, 187; Human Rights Watch 1996, 19). After the genocide, 
women took on new roles in the domestic and public spheres that Rwandan society had 
previously not ascribed to them. These roles included everyday tasks customarily taboo for 
women, like putting roofs on houses, constructing enclosures around houses, or milking cows, 
and, additional roles in society, such as head of household or government administrator (Burnet 
2008a, 384). Many Rwandan women took on primary economic responsibility for their 
households because their husbands were either absent or unable to do it.  Prior to the genocide, 
Rwandan law forbade Rwandan women from engaging in commercial activities, entering into 
contract, or seeking paid employment without authorization from their husbands (Human Rights 
Watch 1996, 22).  In practice, many husbands (and even most husbands in the cities) allowed 
and even encouraged their wives to work, but the husbands often controlled the women’s salaries 
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or profits from commercial endeavors. Women’s businesses were vulnerable, in practice and by 
law, to plunder by their husbands or to complete takeover (Jefremovas 2002, 97-108). 
With the disruption in gender relations, some women found the freedom to pursue careers 
or commercial activities.  Yet, this “opportunity” to challenge customary notions of womanhood 
and women’s roles in the family and community should not be portrayed too rosily, as some 
journalists and feminist policy analysts have tended to do.  For peasant women in rural areas, the 
absence of husbands increased the burden of crushing poverty and social isolation. Farming 
without their husbands’ labor resulted in a heavier workload and lower yields, as well as reduced 
social status in the community (Burnet 2008a, 385).  The lack of income from husbands’ labor  
in the cash economy left widows and prisoners’ families without the money necessary to pay for 
health care or school fees.  For middle class and elite women, their new found “freedom” was 
bittersweet.  Even the most successful business women lamented the heavy burden of bearing 
sole financial responsibility for themselves and their children—not to mention the social, 
emotional, and psychological consequences of widowhood or single motherhood.13 Many 
researchers have understood this gender revolution as an example of war disrupting normal 
social relations, however, others (Burnet 2008a; Longman 2006; Newbury and Baldwin 2000; 
Newbury and Baldwin 2001a; Newbury and Baldwin 2001b) have demonstrated that the war and 
genocide accelerated transformations that were already underway in Rwandan society.   
Since 1999, the Government of Rwanda has simultaneously pursued three types of 
quotas: reserved seats, party quotas, and legislative quotas. The first reserved seats were created 
through administrative decisions about the 2001 local level elections where female candidates 
stood for seats reserved for women at the cell, sector, and district levels. The 2003 Constitution 
created reserved seats for women in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of parliament. 
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Party quotas have been pursued since at least 1994 with the creation of the transitional 
government. Political parties sought to nominate female candidates for cabinet posts or to 
include women on party lists for government appointments. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) , 
the de facto state party, has mainstreamed women in its own infrastructure since its origins as a 
rebel army, with women occupying important posts in the party, and in the Rwandan government 
after they came to power in 1994 (Burnet 2008a, 363). Many of the RPF policies and approaches 
have been modeled after those of the Museveni and the National Resistance Movement in 
Uganda (Burnet 2008a, 367). Powley (2005, 159) attributed the RPF’s approach to gender as 
emerging out of Tutsi exiles’ experiences of discrimination.14 According to statements from RPF 
leaders, such as Rose Kabuye and John Mutamba, the RPF embraced notions of gender equality 
in the hopes of improving society. Since at least 1998, other political parties have actively 
recruited female candidates, promoted women to cabinet level appointments, included them on 
party lists, and put them forward as candidates in general elections for non-reserved seats.15 As a 
result of these policies, Rwanda elected the first female majority national legislative chamber in 
2008 when women secured 56.25% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, far surpassing the 
30 percent reserved seats for women.16 As Meier (N.d.) found in the Belgium, the rising number 
of women in Rwandan politics cannot be attributed to gender quotas alone; in Rwanda many 
women won seats not reserved by the quota system. The 2003 constitution provided legislative 
quotas guaranteeing that women should comprise at least 30% of all positions in decision-
making bodies and not only the national legislature (see article 9, number 3). 
Since gaining a female majority in parliament, the Forum of Women Parliamentarians 
(FWP), a caucus for female members of parliament, has struggled to define a legislative agenda 
for women. In 2004, the FWP did not take specific policy stances on the 2004 Land Law. Instead, 
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they, along with the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development, stated that land was an 
issue for all Rwandans and not just for women despite the fact that a policy study by LandNet 
found that rural women viewed land rights as central to their livelihood and well-being (Burnet 
and RISD 2003). Before gaining this majority, the FWP led several policy initiatives to enhance 
women’s rights, including the 1998 inheritance law, which gave women and girls equal rights to 
inheritance and established the capacity for women to keep their property separate in marriage, 
and the inclusion of gender quotas in the 2003 constitution. In 2006, the FWP found a unifying 
women’s issue, gender-based violence (GBV), and drafted a bill. A UNIFEM press release 
erroneously stated that the parliament passed the bill in 2006 (Zirimwabagabo, 1996), but the law 
languished in committee for nearly two years.17 The GBV bill finally became law in 2008 and 
added important protections to women’s rights and made domestic violence illegal under 
Rwandan law (Republic of Rwanda, 2009a). While the GBV bill was an important victory, less 
than a year later the majority female parliament approved a new labor code that reduced 
maternity leave from eight to two weeks of paid leave and increased the work week from five to 
six days and from forty to forty-five  hours (Republic of Rwanda, 2009b). As discussed later in 
this article, ordinary Rwandans  often pointed to this labor legislation as an example of how 
female parliamentarians put their individual interests (i.e., staying in their positions) ahead those 
of average Rwandan women’s interests. Urban elites frequently cited the new labor law as an 
example of “politics as usual” meaning the legislature rubber-stamped whatever laws the 
executive branch or RPF inner circle mandated. 
Several scholars have argued that women’s increased presence in government sends 
important signals to female citizens that lead them to become more politically involved or feel 
more politically efficacious (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; High-Pippert and Comer 
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1998). Yet others have found that the election of women appears to have only weak effects on 
trends in women’s political engagement (Karp and Banducci 2008). In Rwanda, the impact of 
gender quotas on women’s political engagement, defined as participation in elections, is difficult 
to assess because voting is required in practice although not by law. Participation in elections is 
recorded on citizens’ voter registration cards and since 2009 on the electronic chip embedded in 
the new national identity cards. Local officials question citizens who do not vote and may assess 
fines or withhold government services, such as issuing birth certificates or other documents.  
Measuring the impact of quotas on female citizens’ political involvement or feelings of 
political efficacy is equally difficult because the country is not democratic, and citizens (and 
even legislators) have little capacity to influence policy. Although the political system is 
representative in name, in that parliamentarians are said to “represent” specific geographic 
regions, in practice this representation is fictitious because most members of parliament do not 
reside, and in some cases may never have resided, in the communities they were elected to 
represent. Because elections are staged events with predetermined outcomes, members of 
parliament have little or no incentive to represent their constituents’ interests. In addition, most 
legislation originates in the executive branch so members of parliament rarely generate or even 
shape legislation. In fact, they are strongly incentivized to follow the policies dictated by the 
executive so that they remain in good stead with the RPF and retain their seats in parliament, 
which come with generous salaries, stipends, great social prestige, and many other benefits. 
What is measurable in the Rwandan case is how the dramatic increase of women in the 
public sphere raised “awareness of what women can achieve and legitimate[d] women as 
political actors, unraveling at least to some degree previously accepted gender roles” as 
Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo (N.d.) describe symbolic representation. In conversations with 
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a wide variety of Rwandans, in group interviews with grassroots women’s organizations, and in 
individual interviews with leaders of women’s civil society organizations conducted in May and 
June 2009, most respondents agreed that gender quotas and the increased representation of 
women in the political system have encouraged women to take leading roles in others areas of 
Rwandan society.  
Winning the Race: Positive Perceptions of Gender Quotas and their Impact 
In 2009 when asked whether broader cultural changes had been provoked by gender 
quotas, women responded with a decisive yes. Respondents consistently reported that women felt 
freer to speak out in public, had increased access to education, and had become “entrepreneurs” 
in every arena, including politics. Although interviewees gave these responses to questions about 
gender quotas, my ethnographic data going back to 1997 make it clear that several other factors 
have also impacted Rwandan women’s political subjectivity (Burnet 2005, N.d.). These factors 
include the large number of female-headed households after the genocide, the experiences of 
women in refugee camps between 1994 and 1996 or 1997, the roles of women’s organizations 
and local associations before and after the genocide, the roles played by international 
organizations encouraging women’s engagement with community matters, the 1998 elections of 
grassroots women’s structures, and the cell, sector and district level elections in 2001. 
Women as Entrepreneurs in Every Arena. The majority female legislature and inclusion 
of many more women in all levels of the government have had a dramatic impact on Rwandan 
society more generally. In response to a question about the impact of gender quotas in the 
Rwandan political system, one female interviewee said,  
You  see that women have become true entrepreneurs in every arena. Most of the 
cars on the road today in Kigali are driven proudly by women. They [women] 
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have raced ahead and seized every opportunity. They have gone back to school to 
get their degrees. They have started businesses. They have joined the Party 
[referring to the RPF] and gotten government posts.18 
Women have surged ahead in all domains in the wake of the 2003 Constitution which created 
legislative gender quotas.  
While the majority female legislature has been an important symbolic victory for 
Rwandan women, of greater impact has been women’s increased engagement in local level 
governance structures. Many women serve as local level (village, cell, sector, or district) elected 
officials in posts not reserved for women. Their acceptance by local communities represents a 
sea change in public attitudes towards women. Increased participation of women at the local 
level has helped to legitimate women as political agents in the popular imagination of rural 
people. When asked whether women were capable of leading and wielding power as well as men, 
one woman from North province responded, “better than the men even. A woman knows what 
she should do and when she should do it,” implying that men can easily be distracted from their 
mission by other things such as beer or women. 
 Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004, 1428) found that female citizens in India were twice as 
likely to communicate with local elected officials if there was a female elected official occupying 
a seat reserved for women through gender quotas. My findings in Rwanda suggest a similar 
effect. Several women interviewed in 2009 noted that the gender quota policies had given 
women an advantage over men in regards to problem-solving. As one woman stated in a group 
interview with a women’s cooperative in a rural community in North province, “A woman can 
easily approach her female friend who is an authority. This authority understands her well and 
can help her with her problems. That’s where the men have found problems.”19 Thus, female 
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community members hope a female local authority can understand things from their perspective 
and give assistance in their capacity as government officials. Yet, this respondent also noted that 
men felt that they have lost out because they no longer have the advantage of approaching local 
authorities informally at a local bar over a beer to expose their problems and seek a solution. 
Furthermore, as I discuss in detail below, not all interviewees indicated that female local 
authorities were any different than the men in this or other regards. 
Speaking Out in Public. In a 2009 group interview, one respondent said, “women dare to 
speak up at public meetings…There is a Kinyarwanda proverb that says, ‘Nta nkokokazi ibika 
hari isake— Hens do not crow where there is a rooster’.”20 Over the past fifteen years, I have 
often heard this proverb used to express the notion that women should be silent in public and 
allow men to speak on behalf of the entire community. According to custom, husbands (or 
fathers or brothers) represented a household in meetings, and they voiced any concerns of the 
household on behalf of all household members, including their wives (or daughters or sisters). 
Yet, as will be discussed in more detail below, a wife could represent the household in meetings 
if her husband was absent. Nonetheless, before the implementation of quotas in the 2003 
constitution, women were unlikely to speak up at public meetings and were easily silenced by 
men if they did not agree with the women’s opinions. 
The willingness of women to speak in public settings has grown dramatically since 2003. 
When I interviewed women members of a church-based organization in a rural community in 
southern Rwanda in 2001, they expressed reluctance to speak up at public meetings although 
they were active participants in the life of their own organization. When I returned in 2007 and 
again in 2009, the same women proudly recounted their vocal participation in local government 
and community meetings. Several of the association members served as inyangamugayo (judges) 
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in the cell and sector level Gacaca courts that had been responsible for adjudicating cases of 
genocide between 2003 and 2007.21 In addition, the association members had conducted their 
own investigations, located witnesses, and advocated for the release of people falsely accused of 
genocide during the Gacaca process. All of these activities were somewhat risky given lingering 
tensions over the genocide. The women attributed their willingness to speak out to the broader 
impact of the national gender quota policy on men and women’s attitudes towards female 
citizens’ competency. The large number of women in local government coupled with the clear 
endorsement of women as political authorities by President Kagame, the RPF, and central 
government sent a clear message to rural citizens that women must be accepted as legitimate 
political agents or local government authorities.  
Greater Access to Education. Many interviewees in 2009 cited girls’ increased access to 
education as a benefit of the increased representation of women in governance. National 
campaigns to promote universal education as well as the new found career opportunities for 
educated women convinced many rural families that educating female children was a worthwhile 
investment. A female interviewee noted that “girls attend school in large numbers in Rwanda 
today, not like in the past when they were kept at home to cook, clean, take care of younger 
children, and work in the fields.”22 World Bank Development Indicators support the perception 
that more girl children attend school now than in the past and that girl children attend school in 
greater numbers than boy children.23 Although the campaign for universal education cannot be 
directly tied to the increased representation of women in government or to gender quotas, in the 
minds of average citizens, particularly rural farmers, increased education of girl children is 
connected to gender quotas because these initiatives are perceived as being part of the 
government policy initiative to improve the status of women. 
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Joint decision-making over domestic resources. Rwandan women in colonial and 
postcolonial times lived beneath a legal regime that subordinated them to men by impeding 
women’s economic autonomy. Many of the women-friendly policies implemented by the RPF-
led government since 1994 have improved women’s economic autonomy by restoring individual 
economic rights to married women. The transformation in women’s economic independence 
accelerated rapidly starting in 1998 well before the creation of legislative gender quotas. In 
interviews and focus groups conducted in 2009, the most frequently mentioned impact of 
legislative gender quotas in Rwanda was on the joint decision-making over domestic resources in 
Rwanda and the increased autonomy of women as economic subjects.  
Woman, North province: Before, the husband made decisions on his own. For 
example, a husband wanted to buy a field without his wife knowing it. He sold 
livestock as he wished without consulting his wife. But, today, the men must try, 
and we discuss things together to see the advantages and disadvantages. And, in 
making decisions about having children, we make them together. Except for some 
men who do not understand, this [policy] helps people to make decisions together. 
Before the state made this law, the men did as they wished. They brought many 
wives [married more than one woman at a time]. But now, that is no longer the 
case.24  
Woman, South province: There are men who sit down with their families and they 
make their decisions together. A daughter who cultivated a field of cassava with 
her mother and they made 60,000 RwF profit. When they showed the money to 
the father, they decided to buy a cow. The cow is there, and the husband is very 
happy, and he encourages his wife and daughter.25  
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Female interviewees, even those who classified their marriages as “good” before the 1994 
genocide and civil war, noted a change in the ways that spouses made decisions about family 
resources. They said that their husbands had begun to recognize that wives sometimes had good 
ideas and that women were less likely to waste their money on alcohol or gambling.  
 Another key change that interviewees noted in 2009 was women’s autonomy as 
economic agents to go out and become entrepreneurs. One woman explained how this change 
enhanced family life and marriage, “A wife can leave the house to go find money like men. In 
this way, there aren’t any conflicts. Husband and wife, together, find a way to move the family 
forward [develop the family].”26 Increased economic autonomy was not a benefit cited by all 
women. For instance, widows and other female heads of household emphasized how difficult it 
was to bear sole responsibility for the financial well being of the family and the challenges of 
balancing work (whether managing a farm, a business, or a professional job) and domestic 
responsibilities. 
“Women have found respect.” Perhaps the most significant evidence of the impact of 
gender quotas on the symbolic representation of women in Rwandan governance was the 
repeated mention that the inclusion of women in governance helped women “find respect” 
(babona agaciro). The word I have translated as respect, agaciro, can also mean utility, value, 
importance, or (good) reputation (Jacob 1984, 188).  
In interviews and focus groups conducted in 2009, the term agaciro frequently came up 
when women were commenting on the impact of quotas on relationships between men and 
women in the community or in the home. In response to a follow up question about the reduction 
in domestic violence in the region, one woman explained that husbands no longer hit their wives 
“because of awareness raising campaigns and because men have realized the dignity of women 
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(agaciro k’umugore).”27 This woman implicitly linked quotas to the government’s awareness 
campaigns against domestic violence and explicitly linked the campaigns to men’s changed 
attitudes. Another woman attributed the change in men’s behavior to women gaining respect, 
“women have found respect (babonye agaciro), the men no longer have many wives, almost not 
at all now.”28 Respondents in this focus group went on to explain the ways women supported 
each other to oppose a husband who took a second wife and force him to leave her. One woman 
explained women’s liberation as a fait accompli that a few stubborn men had yet to accept, 
“there are still those men who do not want to accept the authority of women, who don’t know 
that women have found respect (yahawe agaciro).”29   
Almost universally, urban and rural women voiced pride about the change in the status of 
women in Rwandan society. One rural woman marveled, “even the population obeys these 
female authorities. It’s a step forward for us [women].”30 Yet, class distinctions emerged in the 
responses. Urban women and rural elite women tended to focus on the spreading of so-called 
“modern” ideas about the equality of the sexes to less educated Rwandans. Peasant women, on 
the other hand, tended to talk more about the recognition of women’s innate dignity by both men 
and women, but by men especially. These class distinctions are important since urban and rural 
elite women have benefitted from gender quotas in material ways more than peasant women. As 
I discuss later, peasant women have found their unpaid service in local governance structures to 
be an added burden on their already heavy load. By contrast, urban and rural elite women who 
worked for a salary, ran a business, or supported a husband’s career used their unpaid 
government service as a means to accrue social capital.  
In sum, when responding to questions about the broader impacts of the gender quota 
policy on Rwandan society, respondents did not explicitly cite women’s increased representation 
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as the impetus for change in gender roles. Rather, they linked the gender quota policies to a 
broader set of equality reforms implemented by the RPF-led government. These reforms, as a 
whole, have changed perceptions about, and the activities involved in, women’s roles. Given that 
policy implementation is top-down, and given that members of parliament were not perceived as 
representing constituents, it is no surprise that citizens linked gender quotas to broad government 
initiatives that increased women’s public presence. 
Who are the losers? The Downsides of Greater Equality 
While most interviewees mentioned positive changes in Rwandan society resulting from 
quotas and the empowerment of women more generally, several also mentioned unexpected 
downsides. After all, if women are perceived as winning greater opportunities and autonomy, 
then logically another group must be perceived as losing them. While I never asked a direct 
question about men’s perceptions of these changes (to avoid generating biased responses), 
several respondents spontaneously stated that men, or at least some men, felt as if they had lost 
out because of the advancement of women. Three key themes emerged in the interviews: 
brother’s anger over the extension of inheritance rights to women, men’s withdrawal from 
politics, and increased marital discord. 
 Angry Brothers. When asked about social changes related to the gender quotas, many 
female respondents noted that the 1998 inheritance law had increased friction between women 
and their brothers. Again, respondents perceived quotas as one component of a set of policies 
that have extended and protected women’s rights to and increased opportunities and equality for 
women.  
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Woman, North Province: Our brothers have never been happy because they are 
obliged to divide the property of our parents with us. It’s a total negative for the 
men.31 
Woman, North Province: Allowing women to inherit is good, but we now have 
conflicts with our brothers. They [an anonymous “they”, meaning “the 
government”] say that we should inherit property from both our in-laws and our 
own lineage as well. They [our brothers] have found that they are the losers.32 
Given that it is fathers and brothers who traditionally intervened when women found themselves 
in difficult or violent marriages and who offered land (and thus, livelihood) in the event of a 
failed marriage or early widowhood, increased friction with their male siblings puts women, 
especially peasant women, in a more fragile position socially. 
 Male Withdrawal from Politics. Before the 1994 genocide, politics, whether at the 
national, regional or local level, were largely monopolized by men. Although a few prominent 
women stood out, including Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the Prime Minister in April 1994 and one 
of the first politicians killed in the genocide, men dominated the political arena. With the rise of 
women in Rwandan politics since the late 1990s, many men have turned away from politics as a 
career because “women are the winners.”33 Given that the outcomes of most elections in Rwanda 
are predetermined, some men present their candidacy but they know in advance that the position 
will go to a woman. 
 Furthermore, quotas have influenced civil society organizations to favor female 
candidates over males with similar qualifications. This corrective to past gender biases has 
catapulted women ahead but made some men feel left out. As a result of this perceived exclusion 
from government and civil society organizations (the primary employers in the Rwandan 
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economy), many men preferred to focus their energies on private business endeavors. Other men 
faced long-term unemployment leading to crises of self-identity.  
 Related to this withdrawal from politics was a general “psychological complex” among 
men that it was “not even worth it to try” because the “good positions” always went to women.34 
As one elite woman from Kigali noted, “it’s as if men have a complex nowadays.”35 She went on 
to explain that more women than men returned to school to seek degrees necessary for the 
constantly rising employment standards and that it seemed as if some Rwandan men “do not 
even try.” 
 Marital Discord. Rural and urban respondents cited increased marital discord as a 
consequence of the quotas and improved status of women. Rural respondents attributed the 
increased discord to men’s ignorance about women’s dignity and rights whereas urban 
respondents attributed it to women “behaving like men,” meaning that women’s greater 
economic autonomy had led them to enjoy individual freedoms, such as socializing after work, 
that had previously been reserved for men. 
Many women interviewed, particularly married women, indicated that many husbands 
were frustrated about their wives’ participation in governance.  
Author: How have people here received these changes? 
Woman: Positive for the women, negative for the men. Men have never been able 
to understand sudden changes. They are not at all happy that women are 
progressing. Urugo ruvuze umugore ruvuga umuhoro— At home when the wife 
speaks, out comes the knife.36 
Here, the respondent focused on the transformation in women’s agency and willingness to speak 
out by drawing on a Rwandan proverb. This proverb means that a vocal wife in the home means 
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that there is little peace or harmony in the family. Rwandan custom calls ideologically for a 
wife’s submission to her husband and his decisions. Yet, most wives who characterized their 
marriages as “good” stated that husbands consult with wives when making important decisions. 
Nonetheless, when husband and wife do not agree, the husband’s decision prevails. One 
consequence of women’s empowerment was that some wives were less willing to silence 
themselves when they thought their husbands were making unwise decisions. While I cannot use 
the data I have gathered to estimate how widespread this phenomenon was, the issue was 
frequently mentioned as a contributing factor to marital discord. Of greater consequence to 
marital discord, however, were the competing responsibilities to household and community that 
women in elected positions must negotiated. 
Many rural women interviewed in 2009, whether they thought gender roles in Rwanda 
had changed a lot or “not at all” as a result of quotas, said that the gender revolution in Rwanda 
had increased domestic conflict for some families. Two primary reasons for increased conflict 
were cited: (1) husbands who had not come to recognize the “dignity of women,” and (2) 
husbands who were frustrated by the lack of benefits to the domestic unit from wives’ service as 
local officials.  
For those [men] who do not understand [the gender equality laws], there are 
always conflicts in the family, always fights, because the men say, “When has 
there ever been a wife who makes decisions for the household?” If these conflicts 
persist, then there is a divorce. … It does not happen all that often but even so this 
type of story is not unheard of.37  
Rural married women elected to village, cell, sector or district level administrative positions 
often found themselves at a loss to explain to their husbands “what good” was coming of their 
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work as a government official. Local level officials did not receive a salaries or stipends, and 
they spent a great deal of time exercising their duties as well as participating in meetings or 
trainings. As one woman from North Province stated, 
We never thought that things would be like this. A wife leaves her family for 
trainings, for communal labor, for meetings, and then a week has gone by. No 
time to work at home nor to go to the fields. The husband who is there thinks you 
are going to come with something for the family [i.e., money or other tangible 
benefit]. You see, there is nothing but trouble and conflicts in the family. When 
you think about leaving this position, something that is not at all easy to do, you 
are accused of having the [genocidal] ideology.38 We have found that it’s not 
anything more than exploitation, creating poverty in our families … we are going 
to die.39 
Many wives noted that their husbands were angry or frustrated that wives were absent from the 
home and the fields with “nothing to show for it.” In the past, men who served in local level 
positions reaped many social benefits such as increased prestige in the community as well as 
increased networking opportunities and small “gifts” (in the form of beer, crops, or money) given 
by citizens in gratitude for duties rendered by a local official. Women local officials were not 
gaining these benefits due to perceived gender differences as well as vigorous anti-corruption 
campaigns by the Rwandan government. 
 Beyond lamenting the lack of tangible benefits, men made their wives’ workload heavier 
by not assisting their wives with their work in the fields, at home, or in their role as local 
officials. Most rural women cannot afford to hire workers to assist with the numerous duties that 
fall on a wife’s shoulders: cooking, cleaning, caring for children, and fetching water at home, 
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and planting, weeding, and harvesting in the fields. Since local-level elected officials were not 
compensated through salaries or stipends, rural women were left to their own devices to manage 
these competing responsibilities. While female local officials would have been able to justify 
their absence to their husbands if they were “bringing something home,” the women arrived 
“empty-handed.” Their husbands became angry because they believed that their wives were 
shirking their duties in the home.  
 Interviewees and focus group participants in urban areas also brought up increased 
marital discord as an unexpected outcome of quotas and other equality initiatives. Urban 
respondents attributed increased marital discord to women “behaving like men,” referring to both 
positive and negative aspects of women’s changed behavior. On the positive side, respondents 
cited things like increased assertiveness in decision-making about the family and family 
resources as well as increased educational attainment among women that improved their ability 
to find lucrative employment. On the negative side, respondents cited several unexpected 
consequences of women’s independent work and social lives as well as their increased economic 
autonomy and legal protection. Because more wives had their own careers that provided 
sufficient economic means to lead an independent life, women were less likely to be “stuck” in 
unsatisfactory marriages as they had been in the past. Furthermore, the strengthened legal 
protections of women’s rights made seeking divorce less risky for urban women. The downside 
of this increased autonomy, according to respondents, was rising divorce rates.  
Many respondents explained that the “promotion of women,” referring not only to quotas 
but the entire set of government initiatives to increase women’s equality, had resulted in women 
spending more time outside the home. More women worked outside the home and took night 
courses at the many new universities. Respondents concluded that because women spent more 
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time outside the home, they had more contact with men other than their husbands. As a result, 
some women had begun to “behave like men” by taking lovers outside of marriage. Whereas in 
the past, many wives tolerated similar dalliances by their husbands given the economic risks 
involved in divorce, men were less constrained. Thus, according to the perceptions of many 
urban elites, gender quotas and policies promoting women’s equality destabilized the institution 
of marriage. 
Nothing has changed: Gender, Power and Democratic Legitimacy 
A key measure of the impact of gender quotas on the symbolic representation of women 
is whether the way “citizens feel about government generally” has changed and whether the 
increased presence of women in governance has led “them to judge democratic institutions as 
more just and legitimate” (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, N.d.). Baldez (2006, 104) states that 
gender quotas “can revitalize public faith in the political system” as they did in Latin America in 
the past 15 years. In Rwanda, however, the gender quotas have had little effect on popular 
perceptions of the government’s legitimacy. Although most respondents cited numerous social or 
cultural changes resulting from the gender quota policies, several respondents stated explicitly 
that “nothing has changed” in terms of gender roles, political power, or the democratic 
legitimacy of the state in Rwanda.  
Several rural women with low levels of formal education but high levels of engagement 
in community based organizations insisted that little had changed in terms of gender roles in 
Rwandan society, mostly because women heads of household have always made decisions. As a 
woman from a rural community in South Province explained, “Nothing has changed. A woman 
who is alone usually makes decisions by herself. She is used to doing everything for herself. 
Who is she going to ask for advice? We haven’t noticed a change because a woman who is by 
   30 
herself doesn’t have a rival.” In other words, widows and female heads-of-household have 
always exercised power in the family and in the community as heads of household and as 
symbolic “men.” 
Another woman from a town in North province said that quotas “have changed nothing 
really. Except to make things worse.” She went on to characterize the inclusion of women in 
local governance structures as a form of exploitation that increased the work overload of rural 
women in the service of maintaining the ruling RPF’s hold on power, an issue I explore more in 
depth below. A female CSO leader and RPF party member likewise found that rural women have 
found their increased role in local governance to be an added burden.  
Many international organizations link women and better governance, a link often 
reiterated by Rwandan officials. However, the view from below is quite different. Peasants 
generally view female officials as “no better than men,” in that female representatives face the 
same pressures to comply with directives from above and the same human frailties and 
temptations to corruption. For instance, when asked whether female local officials required 
bribes one woman replied, “everyone must have that.” She then illustrated her point with the 
following story: 
One thing that happened to me, my husband was going to his parents place to 
divide the fields among the brothers. I went in his place because he wasn’t 
available. A mediator (umunzi), a woman, asked me directly for money by saying, 
“Ma’am if you aren’t able to give us money, your husband won’t have a single 
field here.” I was obliged to give the money; I didn’t have any other choice.40  
Several other male and female respondents confirmed that female local officials were just as 
corrupt as male. Moreover, the increased presence of women has not led Rwandan citizens to 
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perceive the government as a more democratic institution. Also, when asked whether they found 
it easier to talk to a female rather than a male local official, most women stated that it was “no 
different.” These results coincide with those of Zetterberg (N.d.), who found that the 
“undemocratic legacy of Mexican politics” led citizens to mistrust the “old (male) elite” and the 
new (female) representatives. In Rwanda, women parliamentarians were not viewed as 
representing either women’s interests or the interests of the communities they were formally 
elected to represent. 
As Baldez (2006, 105) found for many Latin American countries where candidate 
nomination is a highly centralized process, gender quotas in Rwanda have reinforced the status 
quo. The result of Rwanda’s gender quota policies in the eyes of many Rwandans, especially 
well-educated elites in Kigali, is that it has solidified the RPF ruling party’s hold on power. In 
the words of a former (male) Senator and member of an opposition political party, the only thing 
gender quotas have done is “to ensure RPF dominance.” Because positions in the legislature and 
the ministries are well paid and come with many benefits, women who have benefited from 
quotas and occupy these positions owe their loyalties to the RPF, which echoes the importance of 
patronage politics found in Morocco by Sater (N.d.) and in Uganda by O’Brien (N.d.). In 
Rwanda, no matter which party they are affiliated with, women parliamentarians toe the line in 
order to remain where they are. They rarely mobilize around “women’s issues” and in some 
cases have voted for legislation that reduced legal protection of women or eliminated women 
friendly policies.  
Conclusion 
When measuring the impact of gender quotas on the symbolic representation of women, 
it is important to ask whether quotas have altered “gendered ideas about the public sphere, which 
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have traditionally associated men with politics and women with the realm of home and the 
family” (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, N.d.). In Rwanda, gender quotas have transformed 
gendered ideas about the public sphere. Legislative gender quotas and policies promoting 
women’s rights have promoted women in public life. In urban and rural political spaces, women 
have taken visible roles in local government, business, and civil society. Yet, these changes did 
not emerge solely from the legislative gender quotas instituted in 2003. Rather, their origins date 
to the emergence of women’s civil society organizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Burnet 2008a; Newbury and Baldwin 2000; Newbury and Baldwin 2001a; Newbury and 
Baldwin 2001b). Nonetheless, gender quotas adopted by political parties in the 1990s and the 
legislative quotas in 2003 accelerated these pre-existing processes of change. 
Because the Rwanda is so frequently cited as a gender quota success story, it is vital to 
assess broader transformations in Rwandan society accurately. While the Rwandan parliament 
was the first and only in the world to be majority female, the increased representation of women 
brought little change to the legislative process. Most legislation originates in the executive 
branch, and the majority women parliament has created little legislation improving the status or 
rights of women. Furthermore, increased female representation has not ushered in a more 
democratic political era; the executive branch still maintains tight control over civil society 
organizations, the media, and elections. As Zetterberg (N.d.) shows in Mexico, gender quotas are 
embedded in the broader political context, and thus have little effect on women’s political 
engagement or on the perceived legitimacy of democratic institutions among the electorate. 
The Rwandan case does illustrate, however, that gender quotas can have impacts beyond 
the political sphere. The RPF’s top-down policies have improved women’s economic and 
professional opportunities and increased their social mobility. Since gender quotas apply to all 
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levels of government from the parliament all the way down to the “village” (umudugudu), the 
smallest administrative unit, their impact has been broad and deep. Gender quotas have reversed 
the colonial and post-colonial gender paradigm where men worked in the public sphere while 
women managed the domestic sphere and remained financially dependent on men. This symbolic 
reversal has benefitted urban women more than rural women because urban women have found 
increased access to salaried positions and greater purchasing power while rural women in local 
government positions have faced increased workloads without remuneration.  
Another important finding of this case is that citizens do not distinguish between the 
impact of legislative gender quotas and the many other policy changes that improve the status of 
women and girls (such as mandatory primary school education). Perhaps, citizens’ frequent 
contact with local level government officials and the distance of parliamentarians leads them to 
focus on changes in their everyday lives. The prevalence of generalized responses to specific 
questions about women and politics in my data, however, signals an important reality of 
Rwandan life: criticism of the government, the RPF, or President Kagame and of policy or 
legislation is risky. By citing broader benefits of a set of policies and laws that improved the 
status of women in Rwandan society, respondents avoided making specific, and possibly critical, 
statements about those in power. In rare instances, respondents who trusted me and other 
listeners made frank (and critical) statements about some of the negative consequences of the 
gender quotes, their impact on symbolic representation of women, and the tightly controlled 
nature of politics. 
Several lessons can be drawn from this case study. First, having more women in 
government does not necessarily lead to greater democracy or a more democratic government. 
Second, even when implemented as top-down policies put in place by an authoritarian regime, 
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gender quotas and equality policies more broadly can lead to significant cultural changes in 
attitudes towards and perceptions of women and their competence. Third, more women in 
government can lead to increased political, social and economic agency among all female 
citizens and not only those women in government. Finally, women’s increased autonomy can 
have unintended negative consequences such as marital discord, rising divorce rates, and an 
increased workload on women who are already overburdened.  
The Rwandan case suggests that Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler’s (2005) finding that 
increased formal and descriptive representation of women increases legislature’s responsiveness 
to women’s concerns does not hold true for (non-democratic) authoritarian states. Given that 
women legislators in Rwanda are more beholden to the RPF political party than to the 
constituents who, in theory if not in practice, elected them, it is not surprising that these women 
legislators supported legislative proposals (such as the labor law) emerging from and supported 
by the executive branch. Nonetheless, if Pearson’s (2003) assessment of Rwandan 
parliamentarians’ lack of experience drafting legislation is accurate, then hypothetically we may 
see greater legislative initiative on the part of the FWP and parliamentarians in the future. 
Current signs, however, point to the continuation of an authoritarian style of governance in 
Rwanda (Reyntjens 2010). 
The 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections were characterized by severe 
repression of independent media critical of the RPF or President Kagame and by the suppression 
of the few genuine opposition parties that tried to establish themselves (Reyntjens 2010, 12). In 
addition, average Rwandans lived in great fear during the months leading up to the elections. 
This fear was best summed up by a genocide survivor who responded “Pray for us,” to an email 
where I asked about the social atmosphere a month before the elections. Shortly, after President 
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Kagame’s landslide victory of President Kagame for his second, and final term under the current 
constitution, a minister in the new cabinet suggested a change in the constitution to allow 
President Kagame to run for a third term.  
This case also confirms that Pitkin’s multi-faceted model of political representation is 
helpful in understanding representation in non-democratic states. Transformations in formal and 
descriptive representation can lead to changes in symbolic representation even if substantive 
representation does not improve. As some interviewees noted, “nothing has changed” in terms of 
substantive representation because increased formal representation has not transformed the 
governance style. Despite Devlin and Eglie’s (2008, 251) finding that Rwandan women 
legislators felt confident that a “gender agenda” was guaranteed by their presence, ordinary 
citizens perceived legislators as putting their own individual interests ahead of the broader 
populations’. Although Pitkin’s model is relevant and helpful, the Rwandan case also suggests 
that the experience of women’s representation is not universal as Devlin and Eglie (2008, 250) 
conclude, but rather it is, at least in part, context specific. Local configurations of state, political, 
and economic power matter as they influence the experience and outcomes of political 
representation. 
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